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As the organizing principle of Western foreign policy, the “rules-based international order” has long suffered from some disastrous flaws. It is a phrase that for a normal person means nothing. As a result, it’s a deeply boring concept. People might go to war to defend freedom or homeland. No one is going to fight and die for the RBIO.
However, senior Western policymakers seem to be enamored of the concept. Antony Blinken, the United States Secretary of State, likes attractive to the rules-based international order when visiting China. Rishi Sunak, the British Prime Minister, has put the RBIO at the center of UK foreign policy. His likely successor, Sir Keir Starmer, a former lawyer, will be equally committed to the idea.
In opposing Russian aggression, Blinken maintains that the United States defends a world based on rules and not pure power. That’s an attractive idea. But the rules must be consistent. And the United States’ own actions are undermining vital parts of the rules-based order.
The last fifteen days have brutally exposed these contradictions. The 100 percent tariffs that the Biden administration has imposed on Chinese electric vehicles are virtually impossible to reconcile with international trade rules. As a paper For Bruegel, a group of experts, expresses it: “Tariffs… . . quash any idea that the United States intends to comply with World Trade Organization rules.”
The US response to the prospect of the International Criminal Court bringing war crimes charges against Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, was also revealing. Instead of supporting the court’s effort to enforce international law, Blinken told the US Congress that the administration would consider imposing sanctions about the ICC.
Of course, the United States can deploy arguments to justify these measures. It is possible to argue that the ICC has exceeded its jurisdiction or wrongly intervened in an ongoing conflict. The United States also insists that China has violated international trade rules for decades.
But, as the saying goes, in politics when you explain, you lose. In much of the world, the United States’ claim to defend the rules-based international order is treated with derision. So what can be saved from this disaster? One answer is for Blinken and company to talk less about the rules-based international order and more about defending the free world. This is a more accurate and understandable description of what Western foreign policy is really about.
The United States, the EU, the United Kingdom, and other democracies such as Japan, South Korea, and Ukraine are currently struggling to contain the territorial and political ambitions of authoritarian countries, most notably China and Russia. A world in which those countries are more powerful will be less safe for free people and countries.
Unlike the defense of a rules-based order (which implies absolute coherence), the defense of the free world involves accepting some necessary inconsistency. During the Cold War, the United States and its allies made some tactical alliances with nondemocratic regimes, as part of a broader effort to contain and ultimately defeat the Soviet Union.
In today’s world, the United States is once again making uncomfortable concessions as part of a broader struggle with major authoritarian powers. US tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles make little sense as a defense of the rules-based order. They make much more sense when viewed as an effort to prevent China from dominating the industries of the future.
In its attempt to combat China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, the United States has accused Beijing of violating the UN convention on the law of the sea. The difficulty is that the United States itself has not ratified that particular convention. So why not accept that the United States’ primary motivation is not to uphold international law itself, but to prevent a crucial trade route from falling under the domination of an authoritarian power?
And what about Israel? Much of what he is doing Biden can be explained by domestic politics. But the instinct to defend democratic allies also underpins his tenacious support for Israel. The United States’ refusal to entertain the idea that Netanyahu may have committed war crimes in Gaza is shameful. But it is easier to understand the discomfort of the United States in a process in which the only democracy in the Middle East is in the dock, while the leaders of Syria and Iran escape prosecution for their crimes.
Reducing rhetoric about the rules-based international order should not mean abandoning international law altogether. That would be a recipe for global anarchy. It would also be reckless and impractical. There is a lot of international law and finding yourself on the wrong side of it can be very disadvantageous. Vladimir Putin – and perhaps soon Netanyahu – will find that their travel plans are severely restricted by ICC orders.
Russia and China always argue that their actions are consistent with international law, even when they blatantly are not. Sometimes the United States will have to do the same. International lawfare is part of the emerging struggle between democratic and authoritarian powers.
That does not mean that both parties are on the same moral level. As in the Cold War and earlier struggles of the 20th century, the world’s democracies need not apologize for being ruthless in defense of free societies.