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FT editor Roula Khalaf selects her favorite stories in this weekly newsletter.
The writer is former head of MI6 and UK ambassador to the UN.
Over the past two weeks, Israel has used its enormous military advantage, backed by AI-enhanced intelligence, to overwhelm Hezbollah. The organization has lost its top leaders and many members of the next generation. Its communications system has been destroyed, as have many of its rocket and missile launch sites. This comes after Hamas’s military capacity has been largely dismantled.
It appears that we are witnessing a substantial shift in the balance of power in the Middle East, in favor of Israel and at the expense of Iran.
Since Hamas’ brutal attack on October 7 a year ago, Iran has been heavy on rhetoric but has done little of substance to protect the militias it helped build. In his speech to the UN, President Masoud Pezeshkian prioritized lifting sanctions, a goal diametrically opposed to engaging on behalf of Hezbollah. Iran’s Vice President for Strategic Affairs, Mohammad Javad Zarif, recently said that supporting the Palestinians did not mean going to war for them. Iran appears cowed, lacking the will and military capacity to respond, and is unprepared to risk internal instability as it enters an uncertain leadership transition.
Israel has smelled Tehran’s weakness and is exploiting its advantage. No one should feel sorry for Hezbollah: for more than 40 years, it has used violence to amass power in Lebanon. Those who live by the sword die by the sword.
How will Hezbollah respond now that it has been brought to its knees? It still has the vaunted precision missiles that could attack Israeli cities. Iran may be holding back Hezbollah as they provided themselves as a deterrent against an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. We don’t know if Iran has a double code on its use. But if Israel begins destroying the missile arsenal, then Hezbollah could face a “use it or lose it” moment.
Widespread deaths of Israeli civilians would likely trigger a ground invasion by Israel, which some in Hezbollah might relish: a chance to even the scores in the hostile terrain through which Israeli forces would have to advance. For that reason, Benjamin Netanyahu would probably prefer to keep his troops on the Israeli side of the border rather than march into Beirut’s southern suburbs and the Bekaa Valley, where Hezbollah’s deadliest missiles are likely to be located. A more limited advance toward the Litani River is possible, but it would leave Israel half in and half out, with no exit strategy.
An alternative path for Hezbollah would be to resort to international terrorism. When well-organized regional groups lose their leadership, a more extreme and violent entity can take their place. Isis emerged after more sophisticated opposition groups were dismantled in Iraq and Syria. Kill experienced political leaders like Hassan Nasrallah and Ismail Haniyeh of Hamas is a gamble for Israel, but it appears to be prepared to face it.
Tough military action against Iranian-backed militias fits perfectly with Israel’s policy, which is increasingly leaning to the right. Ultimately, lasting stability for Israel will only come with a political solution in the region. But the same internal dynamics that are driving Netanyahu to press Israel’s advantage make a broader political agreement more distant. The best time to participate in a political process is when you are strong and your enemies weak. But the composition of Israel’s ruling coalition makes it difficult to envisage a political initiative with the Palestinians divided and misled.
It is generally Americans who try to drive political progress in the region. But the power of the Biden administration, never very strong in the Middle East, is weakening. It takes months for a new administration to decide its priorities, and the approaches of Donald Trump and Kamala Harris would be very different. Meanwhile, the Middle East will remain tense and volatile.
One actor we have heard little about over the past year is Syria. The Syrian regime used to be the arbiter in Lebanon and was willing to kill any Lebanese politician who did not bow to the dictates of Damascus. The regime is now much weaker after the civil war and Bashar al-Assad is no match for his father when it comes to political power plays. But Syria remains relevant as an ally of Iran, Russia and Hezbollah, and a crucial link in Hezbollah’s supply chain.
Although Hezbollah helped the Assad regime survive in 2013-2014, Damascus will want to stay aligned with Iran if it can. He also has bitter memories of the 1982 Lebanon war, when the Syrian air force intervened only to be destroyed by Israel. With Iran and Syria focused on their own affairs, only the distant Houthis appear willing to attack Israel, so far with little effect. This may be the beginning of the final chapter of the Axis of Resistance.