Advances in organoids and embryonic models of human development have the potential to raise social and existential questions; For example, what defines human individuality? However, bioethicist Insoo Hyun of Harvard Medical School and the Boston Museum of Science says that these models have the potential to strengthen rather than weaken the concept of human individuality when considered within the philosophical frameworks of ” personality” and sensitivity. In a comment published on June 20 in the magazine CellHyun maintains that despite enormous advances, we are a long way from developing technologies that allow embryonic or organoid models to achieve personality.
“In the process of elucidating these biological mysteries, human stem cell-based modeling could reframe much of what we consider special about ourselves as simply a reproducible series of physical events,” Hyun writes. “Could these new technologies change our view of ourselves? What does it mean for individuality, for example, that the early embryonic history of each cell line donor can be reproduced over and over again by artificially generating identical human embryo models? ?”
To answer these questions, Hyun dives into the philosophical concepts of personality and sensitivity.
To be a person and not simply an individual, one must possess the ability to make rational decisions and act thoughtfully according to one’s desires. Hyun points out that it is the embryo’s potential to become a person, not its current personality, that matters to most human embryo advocates, and similar issues surround end-of-life patients. However, this potential depends not only on the biology of the embryo or the patient at the end of their life, but also on their technological and circumstantial situation.
“former corporeal Embryos, for example, must not only be genetically and morphologically robust to have a biological chance of becoming a human person, but they must also be chosen (usually by those for whom they were created) to be implanted. in a woman’s womb and carrying it to term,” Hyun writes. “The same goes for patients at the end of life. “Not only must they have the biological potential for their brains to regain function, but they must also be cared for in a hospital by decision makers who have the appropriate technologies at their disposal.”
For embryos used in research and not for assisted reproduction purposes, the circumstantial potential for them to become people is non-existent. Similarly, although organoids can self-assemble and carry out many of the functions of human organs on a small scale, there is no possibility that they can self-assemble into a conscious, independently functioning individual.
“Given that the cognitive bar is set so high for personhood, it seems premature to worry about whether brain organoids, neurological chimeras, or embryo models deserve the ethical protections typically afforded to people,” Hyun writes. “The science is simply not there to support these concerns now and would have to rely on major technical innovations to get there in the future. Even the most extreme forms of neurological chimerism between humans and non-humans that one could imagine would not support fears about La personality emerges in severely altered animals.
Likewise, current in vitro Embryo and organoid models are far from achieving the sensitivity (the ability to have sensory experiences such as pleasure and pain) that is believed to arise in human fetuses after 24 weeks of gestation. The only case in which organoids are likely to experience sensitivity is when they are transplanted into a live animal model, for example the recent study by Stanford researchers who transplanted human brain organoids into rats, but the rats are already considered sensitive , and the ethics of These studies are already discussed as such.
“In response to the question of whether new technologies for modeling human development could destabilize our view of ourselves, the answer is no, not if we are aware of the fundamental distinctions between biological individuals and persons, biological and circumstantial potentiality, and feelings and not – biologically sentient individuals,” Hyun writes. “Rather than weakening the foundations by which we value human life, perhaps greater familiarity with developmental models could strengthen our beliefs by reminding us of what really matters: the well-being of real people and sentient individuals.”