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Erdoğan’s political momentum tests Turkish democracy


The writer is the author of ‘Turkey under Erdoğan’

There is a question on many people’s minds in Turkey today: How did the pollsters get it wrong? Recep Tayyip Erdoğan trailed in most polls ahead of Sunday’s presidential election. Analysts had expected that the collapse of the economy, coupled with the poor state response to the terrible earthquakes in February, would undermine support for the incumbent president.

Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the opposition contender, would have had to finish first in this opening round, or even cross the 50% mark for an outright win. In fact, the opposite has happened. According to the electoral authorities, Erdoğan got 49.5% of the vote with Kılıçdaroğlu behind by more than 4 percentage points. Not only that, but the electoral alliance around the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) appears to have retained its legislative majority. Another term of Erdoğan in power after the May 28 runoff seems likely.

Some conservative voters abandoned the AKP mothership, which is why Erdoğan did not emerge victorious after the first round, unlike in 2014 and 2018. But there was also a lot of hidden support for the reis (or captain, as he is known to his ardent supporters). The shy Conservatives haven’t necessarily disclosed their preferences to pollsters: His brand of strongman has long since lost its public luster.

Turkish nationalism is also in the mix. It was clear from the start that a victory for Kılıçdaroğlu would need the support of the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP). That made it easy to paint him as a sellout to a force that many see as an extension of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a militant organization that has been fighting the state since the 1980s. As a result, some voters decided to support Erdoğan or Sinan Oğan, a nationalist candidate who took a hard line on the Kurdish issue and did unexpectedly well. Whistle tactics also played a part. Kılıçdaroğlu, who revealed his heterodox Alevi heritage during the campaign, was exposed to “he is not a real Turk” insinuation.

In the weeks to come, Erdoğan will build on his momentum. He will entice Oğan supporters with promises to wipe out the PKK from the southeast as well as in Iraq and Syria. There will be increasingly generous offers to the electorate: social spending, higher wages and pensions, reconstruction in crisis-hit regions. Erdoğan will promote Turkey’s status as a first-rate regional power in a multipolar world. With the media largely on his side, he could easily get another win.

If he does, a new term could see Erdoğan tighten the screws on the opposition. His next goal would be to recover Istanbul and Ankara, two cities lost by the AKP in 2019, in next year’s local elections. And if he wins, this would be Erdogan’s last constitutional term as president, unless, like Vladimir Putin in Russia, he has to rewrite the rules to extend his term beyond 2028.

Yet a new presidential term would not be an easy ride. The AKP may have concluded that it can muddle through economic crises, despite Erdogan’s meddling in monetary policy and the undue influence of cronyism around the presidential palace. Investments from the Gulf and booming exports to Russia, with Turkey refusing to join Western sanctions, provide some solace. But the lira remains vulnerable. The runaway inflation will continue to erode living standards, increasing discontent. High energy prices and post-earthquake reconstruction will put more pressure on the country’s fiscal balance.

Both Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy will have reason to be happy if Erdoğan stays in office. He has strong ties to Moscow and Kiev and would continue to reap the benefits of being the go-between. There would be some back-and-forth on Sweden’s NATO membership, but an agreement before the alliance’s July summit is likely within reach. At the same time, Erdoğan will continue to foment anti-Western and anti-US sentiments at home.

A victory by Kılıçdaroğlu could have marked an opening in relations with the EU. However, one from Erdoğan will not necessarily mean friction. Unlike past elections, this one was not accompanied by rhetorical outbursts against Brussels and key member states. Turkey will depend on EU financial inflows, whether it’s a renewal of the refugee deal next year or reconstruction aid. The EU will count on Erdoğan to bring migration under control and to mediate in Ukraine.

Another five years under Erdoğan could jeopardize democratic governance in Turkey and strain relations with the West. But in the long run, all is not lost. Despite Sunday’s result, the opposition and society have shown enough resilience in this election to suggest that there is still life in Turkey’s democracy.


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