F-16s may not win the Ukraine war, but they promise a more equal fight

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The writer is a retired RAF Air Marshal who was previously Director General of Joint Force Development at the UK Ministry of Defence.

Many have questioned why President Volodymyr Zelenskyy pushed so determinedly to supply F-16 fighter jets to his forces in Ukraine. Can a particular aircraft make such a difference? The answer, in the case of the F-16, is yes.

By using the G7 summit to announce that the US would help train Ukrainian pilots to fly the plane, Joe Biden linked his allies to the decision. In effect, Zelenskyy hijacked the event to get the major nations behind Ukraine, just when the Russian military leadership seemed to be turning on itself.

Biden’s initial reluctance about F-16 training was fear of escalation. That the White House has overcome this caution suggests that his risk appetite has increased. His other concern was that the Ukrainians would not be able to operate these planes effectively. NATO would typically package F-16s with a full range of support aircraft considered essential to its operations: electronic warfare, suppression of enemy air defenses, and airborne command and control. Without these, critics argued, the planes would be of little use.

The easiest charge to dismiss is that it would take 18 months to train the Ukrainian pilots. Recent US Air Force tests showed that although the F-16 is a high-performance fighter, experienced Ukrainian pilots could learn to fly it in four months.

In fact, Ukrainian forces have integrated Western weapons into ex-Soviet aircraft on timescales that should put our own peacetime processes to shame. There are legitimate questions about who does the deep maintenance on this Western aircraft, but keeping the F-16 on the front lines shouldn’t be a problem: It’s a simple, mass-produced, single-engine plane, so the Spare parts are plentiful. .

The much bigger issue is who sustains the supply of Western air-to-air missiles. The US Amraam is very capable, but it costs about $1 million each. The long-range European meteorite is even more expensive. While national war stock levels are understandably classified, it’s an open secret that most NATO air forces are short. The allies would do well to speed up their missile supply chains as a matter of urgency.

Lack of supporting air power is more difficult to remedy. Of course, Ukraine cannot replicate NATO’s support functions. But it doesn’t have to be: kyiv isn’t looking for an expeditionary airpower package, operating remotely, deep in enemy territory. You just need to keep the Russian Air Force (VKS) on the defensive in the skies over Ukraine.

The war has so far revealed that the VKS is restricted to operating in very small formations and only in the airspace over the ground that it controls. But it is protected by extensive surface-to-air missiles and has longer-range air-launched weapons that give it an advantage over the Ukrainian team.

The F-16, with its longer-range radars, sensors, and missiles, would restore the Ukrainian air force’s advantage both qualitatively and quantitatively, and push the VKS back into Russia. That, in turn, will protect both Ukraine’s ground forces and its critical infrastructure. But increasing its effectiveness in the absence of a broader airpower package will require imagination.

Integrated air defense systems work much better than those that work in isolation. The Ukrainian air force must link its Western surface-to-air missiles and advanced radar to give its pilots an improved picture of the air battle. Ground-based electronic warfare systems can do a lot to degrade Russian radars and thus its surface-to-air missile belt. The use of rapid prototype drones in reconnaissance and suppression of enemy air defense missions would make Russia’s fighter jets more vulnerable. This package of largely ground-based support systems, much cheaper than airborne ones, would allow Ukraine to retain the initiative in the air battle.

Finally, there is a moral dimension to consider. NATO would fight Russia by first winning the air battle and then using air superiority to push for a more efficient ground battle. Given the weakness of the VKS, this is not a pipe dream. But the limited donations from the West to date have forced Ukraine to apply ground-breaking tactics. We have restricted Kyiv to fight in a way that we would not and to take casualties that we would not.

If we want Russia to be defeated, we must reverse this position. The F-16 decision is a big step in the right direction. These planes may not arrive in time to help Ukraine’s spring offensive, but the announcement will already influence the Kremlin’s military and political calculations. The F-16 is not a panacea, but rather a totem of a fairer fight.