German foreign policy enters a new era

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Happy to see you again. After some delays and numerous political and bureaucratic wrangling, Germany is about to publish its first comprehensive national security strategy. Will it be worth the wait? Will this change, for better or for worse, German foreign and defense policy? I’m at tony.barber@ft.com.

Earlier this month, I attended a conference in London organized by the Hanns Seidel Stiftung, a German public policy foundation, and the University of Cambridge Center for Geopolitics. The conference offered valuable insights into what Germany’s new national security strategy will look like and how effective it will be.

The observation of a German participant made a strong impression on me. She said: “All of our allies, from the United States to Central and Eastern Europe, seem to be sincere in telling us, ‘Germany, please up your game! “”

Germany’s friends on both sides of the Atlantic want to see Berlin take on more responsibility for European security, spend more on defense (and spend it wisely) and, above all, think strategically. So the question is: will the new national security strategy allow Germany to measure up?

What’s in a name?

What is a national security strategy for? Ideally, it defines a conceptual framework for decision-makers to plan foreign, defense and security policies.

It has the advantage of assessing long-term as well as more immediate challenges that preoccupy governments in democracies where the next election is never far away.

It sends a useful signal to citizens, as well as international allies and rivals, about how leaders view the world and their country’s place in it.

The German government originally promised to publish its strategy by last December. Then the deadline slid to the annual Munich Security Conference, which took place in February. Now I hear we can expect it to appear next month, ahead of a July NATO summit in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius.

The weight of history

But to start, let’s recall why Germany is developing such a strategy for the first time. In truth, Germany was beginning to appear as the strange man in Western Europe after France And Great Britain each published national strategies between 2017 and 2021, then updated them in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

However, in the 74 years since the establishment of the Federal Republic in 1949, neither the former West Germany nor the reunified Germany formed in 1990 has shown much inclination to frame foreign policy and defense in a global strategy.

In this regard, history has clearly been a heavy burden: not only the Nazi era of 1933-1945 and the Second World War, but also the division of Germany into two states, one of which worked for 40 years under communism imposed by the Soviets. The rulers of Bonn, and later Berlin, acted as if Germany was the safest as a kind of Greater Switzerland, not offending other countries and pursuing national economic prosperity as if geopolitics were a domain separate and unrelated policy.

This approach had advantages: it reassured the friends of West Germany during the Cold War, and it allowed the emergence of Ostpolitik (reconciliation with eastern neighbours) in the 1970s. But in the post-Cold War era it became increasingly blind, as the allies forcefully argued for many years from Germany, especially the United States and Central and Eastern European countries alarmed by Russian behavior under Vladimir Putin.

Constanze Stelzenmüller, a regular FT columnist, say frankly last year: By the end of the 20th century, Germany had “outsourced its security to the United States, its export-led growth to China, and its energy needs to Russia.”

Echoing this analysis, a participant in the London conference said of Germany’s defense and security policies: “We felt comfortable that the United States was doing the thinking for us.

New times, new way of thinking

Now change is in the air. German policymakers are acutely aware that if Donald Trump or another Republican moves into the White House after next year’s presidential election, the new US administration may have far less patience with relatively low levels of government spending. defense of Germany and the reluctance to demonstrate leadership in Europe.

Another reason behind the decision to produce a national security strategy is simple: the three parties that formed a government after the German Bundestag elections in 2021 – the Social Democrats, the Greens and the Free Democrats – agreed in their coalition program to publish one.

More broadly, as Cornelius Adebahr writes for the Global Policy Journal, many policymakers had felt for some years that the traditional language of German foreign policy had become obsolete. “Whether it’s ‘honest broker’ or ‘effective multilateralism’, ‘never again war’ or ‘change through trade’ (Wandel durch Handel) – after decades of use, these words obscure more than they elucidate,” observes Adebahr.

Finally, although the decision to publish a strategy preceded Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the initiative seems to be a useful way to flesh out the ideas contained in a historic speech delivered by Chancellor Olaf Scholz just days after the outbreak of war. This became known as his Zeitenwende speech after the word he coined to suggest that the invasion of Russia marked a “historical turning point” or “epochal change in geopolitics”.

What will the new strategy say?

According to those who drafted it, the new German strategy is based on three concepts: vigorous defence, resilience and sustainability.

In terms of defence, the idea is to demonstrate that Germany will hear the calls of its allies and assume greater responsibility for European security. This will mean achieving NATO’s goal of devoting at least 2% of gross domestic product to defence, and also supporting EU enlargement and effectiveness.

Resilience means protecting democracy, strengthening the German economic model, supporting international institutions, ensuring access to strategic materials and acting decisively against disinformation.

Sustainability means measures to deal with threats such as climate change and pandemics.

What are the gaps in the strategy?

An unusual outcome of Germany’s debate over its national security strategy is that, while there will be a detailed document setting out the country’s priorities, there will be no national security council to accompany him.

This can turn out to be a serious drawback. As one conference participant put it, “Strategy without guidance is a one-legged animal.”

Why did this happen? Fundamentally, it’s about the internal politics of the German parties. Tripartite coalition politicians could not agree on whether to house a security council in Scholz’s chancellery, or base it in other ministries, including those dealing with foreign affairs and defense.

This dispute reflects the fact that Germany is almost always governed by coalitions, and that the Chancellery and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are usually in the hands of different parties. In today’s coalition, Scholz’s SPD holds the Chancellery and the Greens the Foreign Office under Annalena Baerbock.

Defense expenditure

Another concern is defense spending. Scholz announced a special 100 billion euro fund for military renovations last year, but projects take time to kick off — and that might not be enough to make much of a difference, anyway.

Erich Vad, who was military adviser to former Chancellor Angela Merkel from 2006 to 2013, wrote for the Harvard Kennedy School’s Russia Matters website last month that Germany must spend more than 300 billion euros to bring the armed forces into a state of operational readiness.

By itself, the new national security strategy will not guarantee this kind of additional commitment, because what matters is the political will to do so. However, it is a promising sign that Boris Pistorius, the new German Defense Minister, is show more determination to get things done than most of its predecessors.

Military aid to Ukraine

In this context, it should be noted that after a slow start last year which drew strong criticism from Ukraine and some of Berlin’s NATO allies, Germany has gradually accelerated military, financial and humanitarian aid to Kyiv.

As the Chart from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy below, Germany is one of the largest providers of military aid to the West in absolute financial terms, but not in terms of GDP.

In conclusion, it seems to me that Germany is serious about assuming its responsibilities and allaying the concerns of its allies. But the new national security strategy must be more than a political document written by experts. It must lead to concrete plans, implemented in a timely manner.

What do you think? Will the national security strategy improve German policies? Click here to vote.

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