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The author is director of regional security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. and co-editor of the recently published ‘Turbulence in the Eastern Mediterranean: Geopolitical, Security and Energy Dynamics’
If ever there was a time to use superlatives about Middle East affairs, it is the year 2024. The cascade of events that began in October 2023 has been nothing short of dizzying. If the momentous mix of tragic, spectacular and strategic episodes takes time to settle, what has already happened will undoubtedly have lasting effects.
The diverse and already fragile Levantine societies are undergoing drastic historical transformations. In doing so, they are unlikely to find much outside help, given both local reluctance and global fatigue. The reordering of the region is accompanied by great violence and renewed competition.
Palestinians are experiencing unprecedented suffering in Gaza at the hands of the Israeli army. Hamas’ failed and bloody gamble and the inability of its partners to come to the rescue are a reminder, if necessary, that the only path to achieving a Palestinian state is its internationalization and a negotiated outcome. The coalition for a two-state solution organized by Saudi Arabia, other Arab states and European nations has emerged as the most likely vehicle to achieve this. The Palestinians would need to be convinced that this is more than a symbolic diplomatic dance, but they would also need to demonstrate that they own the process, something that only a long-awaited reform of the Palestinian Authority would achieve. However, such aspirations remain exposed to Israeli intransigence and the possible wrath of Donald Trump.
At the same time, Israeli society has gone from extreme trauma to military triumph in just over a year. This has reinforced the belief that Israel can only rely on its military power and that expansionism in Gaza, the occupied West Bank and now southern Syria is not only justified but necessary. The unconditional support that Israel obtains from the United States and several European states has allowed it to discard the need for a just peace that provides security for all.
But this security-only mindset has perverse consequences. It is costly, increases dependence on the United States, and alienates current and potential partners in the neighborhood, who fear that Israel will widen the conflict by attacking Iran’s leaders and nuclear facilities. The reputational cost of the Gaza war is immense and legal liabilities loom. The authority of Benjamin Netanyahu and his radical acolytes seems assured just as internal fractures grow over the nature of the Israeli state.
For the Lebanese, an opposite dynamic is at play. An arrogant Hezbollah must take into account the collapse of its military strategy, its ideological narrative and its overall credibility. Rekindling his spirit of resistance is a difficult task given the need to lick his deep wounds, the sudden loss of Syria and the desperate situation of his electorate. Many Lebanese who sense an opportunity face two opposing forces: they understand that they will have no further opportunity to reform their state, but they also recognize the danger of provoking a wounded Hezbollah, which could trigger internal conflicts.
Above all, Syrians get their first taste of freedom after decades of oppression. The rot of the Assad regime allowed its rapid collapse, without the feared scenes of mass sectarian violence. Instead, the new Islamist administration in Damascus has shown restraint and some wisdom. However, ensuring peace will require great feats of magnanimity and dedication to inclusive governance, despite internal and external spoilers.
At the very least, Syrians can enjoy the fact that they have exposed the flaws of realpolitik. It is a supreme irony that, a decade ago, most Arab and Western states wanted the Assad regime gone but Syrians were divided. In early December, many Arab and Western states wanted Assad to remain, but Syrians largely rallied to impose internal change. Now they will need foreign goodwill. To achieve Arab-Kurdish reconciliation, Turkish restraint and American diplomacy will be crucial. To reassure the Alawite community, Russian intermediation could help. Gulf states could help neutralize Iranian influence.
Iran is the undeniable loser in all of this. He partnered with militias to increase his influence in disintegrated states and divided societies. He expected these groups to promote his interests, but instead he found himself drawn into the wars they started. Türkiye took advantage of the situation, surpassing Tehran in Syria, the central geopolitical theater of the region.
Many in Western capitals will find solace in the fact that, so far, these historic transformations have been surprisingly contained. Not a massive migration crisis, not a protracted war between states, not a major terrorist attack outside the zone, not a sustained impact on oil prices, not a consequential disruption to global trade. This is the complacency that paves the way for unwanted surprises.