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The author is a Hoover Scholar at Stanford University.
This year may be the year of the missile. Last month, Iran thrown out a salvo of about 150 of them, many of them shot down by American and Israeli missiles. This was followed by an Israeli retaliationand a week later, still another barrage of missiles in response from a militant group based in Iraq (and likely linked to Iran). This year has also seen prolific Houthi missile attacks on international maritime transport in the Middle East, a great Russian missile campaign targeting Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure, and Ukraine ATACMS attacks within Russian-occupied territory.
Why missiles now? And will they change who fights and wins wars?
Missiles (weapons propelled with explosive warheads) have their roots in the German rockets of World War II. During the Cold War, long-range ballistic missiles dominated nuclear competition, but it was not until the microprocessor that missiles crossed over to the conventional battlefield. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 announced a precision-led revolution as computing improved precision, giving way to new anti-tank, anti-aircraft, cruise and conventional ballistic missiles. These long-range precision strike weapons became a pillar of United States foreign policy during the 1990s and early 2000s, as part of shock and amazement bells, Air wars in the Balkans and decapitation terrorist attacks.
Over time, missile technology, once available only to the best militaries, became cheaper and more accessible. Its wide range of sizes and maneuverability gave users the ability to customize arsenals to their own needs. They could, for example, choose between smaller missiles, which are harder to target, and larger, less maneuverable but more lethal variants. Given this flexibility, the missiles could be adapted for attack and defense, capable of being launched from land, air or sea. Unlike many of their drone cousins, the missiles are largely automated or autonomous after launch, requiring limited logistical support or remote control. Above all, missiles (unlike gravity bombs) allow states to launch attacks from long distances, often without the risk of sending a manned platform into an adversary’s territory.
All these characteristics (their availability, flexibility, and ability to mitigate risk) make missiles a weapon of choice in modern combat. But are they as effective as they are attractive? The evidence is mixed. There is no doubt that missiles have revolutionized operational warfare. Advances in anti-tank, anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles have made it more difficult to conceal platforms, making battlefield warfare more dangerous for many attackers. Despite these advantages, there is limited evidence that missiles can, on their own, have a decisive strategic impact.
It has long been a temptation theory of war that surgical strikes targeting strategic centers of gravity or civilian populations could erode political will and convince actors to object without having to launch an invasion. But time and again strategic attack campaigns have failed. The United States was unable to drive back the Viet Cong with waves of B-52s. Their precision strikes against the Taliban were accompanied by a two-decade ground war that ultimately failed. More recently, Iranian missile salvos had little or no impact on Israeli operations in Gaza.
Climb control is also complicated. Missiles are certainly a less risky option than manned aircraft. However, using them to create just the right amount of spin to signal capability and will without triggering an all-out war is a dangerous game of perceptions (and misperceptions). Paradoxically, the greater the effect of missiles, the more likely they are to cross red lines that inadvertently spiral into full-scale conflict.
Perhaps the real way modern missile exchanges upset the balance of power is the way Allowing actors to keep wars limited while they bleed each other dry.. The missiles replace expensive and scarce platforms, benefiting states without sophisticated arsenals of destroyers or stealth aircraft. Houthi missile attacks cost the US tens of millions of dollars to intercept, and impose an even greater expense for the global economy. Even the largely ineffective Iranian missile salvo likely cost Israel, the United States and others more than a billion dollars to defend themselves.
Missiles may rarely win wars on their own, but they can change who starts wars and who can sustain them. Right now the advantage lies with states like Iran, Russia and North Korea, which can increase costs for defenders, while staying below a war threshold at which they would be surpassed by more capable armies. But they should be careful. They may inadvertently start a war that they do not have the arsenal to win.