How Will the Ukrainian War Impact the Next Generation of Europeans?
As Europe continues down a tumultuous path riddled with political strife, one question looms large: will the conflict in Ukraine spark a new generation of Europeans? In this article, we explore the potential ramifications of this conflict on future generations, looking at the history of political generations, voting trends, and more.
The Impact of Historical Political Generations
To understand the potential impact of the Ukrainian conflict, we first need to look at how history has shaped generations in the past. So far, there have been four key political generations that have shaped Europe: the 14ers, the 39ers, the 68ers, and the 89ers.
In each of these cases, a formative moment came early in adult life, which then led to a significant time lag before the affected cohort came to power. For example, the 68ers saw leaders like Joschka Fischer of Germany, Jack Straw of Britain, and Lionel Jospin of France play prominent roles in European politics well into the 2000s. Today, figures like Robert Habeck in Germany are in command.
The Formation of Young Europeans: freedom of movement and climate change
A few years ago, our Histories of Europe project at the University of Oxford investigated formative moments for today’s young Europeans. We found that there wasn’t a single moment comparable to 1989, 1968, or the two world wars. Instead, we found a shared experience of freedom of movement across Europe, as well as a dominant concern: climate change.
However, there were some specific moments for geographic subgroups that we identified. For example, the wars in the former Yugoslavia had a profound impact on young southeastern Europeans, while the eurozone crisis impacted young Greeks, Spanish, and Portuguese. Brexit, meanwhile, had a significant impact on young British and Irish citizens.
The Question of a New Generation of Europeans
While there is hope that Putin’s invasion of Ukraine will galvanize a new pan-European political generation, the reality may be much bleaker. Opinion polls and conversations with young Europeans don’t provide solid evidence to support the idea that such a generation still exists.
In Ukraine, we have met many young people for whom the war will be a significant moment in their political life: a cross between 1939 and 1989. Poland and Estonia have seen a similar effect, though it’s less pronounced. However, it is much less visible in Western Europe, where the war has become just one of many news items.
There are also wide differences in attitude amongst Central and Eastern European countries closest to the warzone. In the Globsec think tank’s most recent vote, around a third of Bulgarian and Slovak respondents said that the West was primarily responsible for the war in Ukraine. Shockingly, 50% of Slovaks agreed that “the United States poses a threat to the security of my country.”
Generational Breakdown
Moreover, the generational breakdown is even less clear. In our research project, only 46% of 18-29 year-olds describe Russia as an adversary, compared to more than 60% of those 60 and older. In some of the 10 European countries surveyed, young people seemed pro-Western, while in others, they were more critical of the West. In support of Ukraine’s future accession to the EU, young Europeans tended to be more positive than older ones.
The Other Side of the Coin
However, these surveys do not establish the relative prominence of the topic. Conversations with young Europeans suggest that issues like climate change, socioeconomic inequality, and what they see as their ruined life chances are at least as important to them as this war. This viewpoint provides an interesting perspective because it opens up the possibility that this generation of young people might have more pressing concerns than the ongoing conflict.
The Creation of Political Generations
So, what can we make of all of this information? Political generations are not born but made, which means that a new generation of Europeans won’t simply emerge from the conflict with Russia. Instead, the students of Göttingen and their peers must take the initiative and create a political class of 22ers that combines the defense of freedom and the restoration of peace in Europe with the concerns of their own generation, such as intersectional equality and the transition to green energy.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the potential for a new generation of Europeans to emerge from the Ukrainian conflict is there, but it’s unknown how significant it will be. History has demonstrated that political generations can be created after significant events, but the current political climate means that young people are focused on pressing issues like climate change and inequality. Ultimately, it’s up to the students of Göttingen, and others like them, to take the reins and create a new political class if they want to see real change.
Summary
The potential for a new generation of Europeans to emerge from the Ukrainian conflict is there, but it’s unknown how significant it will be. History has demonstrated that political generations can be created after significant events, but the current political climate means that young people are focused on pressing issues like climate change and inequality. Ultimately, it’s up to the students of Göttingen, and others like them, to take the reins and create a new political class if they want to see real change.
—————————————————-
| Article | Link |
|---|---|
| UK Artful Impressions | Premiere Etsy Store |
| Sponsored Content | View |
| 90’s Rock Band Review | View |
| Ted Lasso’s MacBook Guide | View |
| Nature’s Secret to More Energy | View |
| Ancient Recipe for Weight Loss | View |
| MacBook Air i3 vs i5 | View |
| You Need a VPN in 2023 – Liberty Shield | View |
The writer is the author of ‘Homelands: A Personal History of Europe’
“Do you think there will be a generation of 22ers?” a student recently asked me in the German university town of Göttingen. A cohort of Europeans, that is, for whom the large-scale war in Ukraine that began with Russia’s invasion in February 2022 shapes the way they think and act politically for the rest of their lives. It is an important question.
The Europe of today has been shaped by four key political generations: the 14ers (with their life-changing World War I youth experience), the 39ers (World War II), the 68ers (1968, in all its different demonstrations) and the 89ers (the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the cold war).
In each case, the formative moment comes early in adult life, so there is a significant time lag before the affected cohort comes to power. 68ers like Joschka Fischer of Germany, Jack Straw of Britain and Lionel Jospin of France played prominent roles in European politics well into the 2000s. German, Robert Habeck, are now in command.
A few years ago, our Histories of Europe project at the University of Oxford investigated formative moments for today’s young Europeans. So, there seemed to be no single moment comparable to 1989, 1968, or the two world wars. Instead, we find a shared experience, that of freedom of movement across Europe, and a dominant concern: climate change. There were, however, some specific moments for geographic subgroups: the wars in the former Yugoslavia for Southeastern Europeans; the eurozone crisis for young Greeks, Spanish and Portuguese; Brexit for British and Irish.
Surely, however, Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine should galvanize a new pan-European political generation. If the biggest war in Europe since 1945 doesn’t, then what?
People often respond enthusiastically to this idea. I, too, would love to see a new political generation with a sense of shared purpose to drive the European project forward. But neither opinion polls nor my conversations with young Europeans offer any solid evidence that it still exists.
In the Ukraine I have met many young people for whom the war will obviously be the decisive moment in their political life: a cross between 1939 and 1989. In Poland and Estonia I have seen a similar effect, although less strong. However, it is much less visible in Western Europe. There is great sympathy for Ukraine here, enhanced by personal encounters with Ukrainian refugees, but the war has become one news among many.
There are wide differences in attitude even among the Central and Eastern European countries closest to the war zone. in the last vote made by the Globsec think tank, about a third of Bulgarian and Slovak respondents say the West is primarily responsible for the war in Ukraine. A shocking 50 percent of Slovaks agree with the statement that “the United States poses a threat to the security of my country.”
The generational breakdown is even less clear. In-depth analysis of vote done for our research project and the European Council on Foreign Relations shows that only 46 percent of 18-29 year olds describe Russia as an adversary, compared to more than 60 percent of those 60 and older.
In some of the 10 European countries we surveyed, young people seemed pro-Western, in others they were more critical of the West. Just in support of Ukraine’s future accession to the EU, young Europeans tend to be more positive than older ones. Globsec analysts tell me they find an equally checkered pattern.
Furthermore, these surveys do not establish the relative prominence of the topic. My conversations with young Europeans suggest that issues like climate change, socioeconomic inequality, and what they see as their ruined life chances are at least as important to them as this war.
Does this mean the 22ers are just a vape dream of the old 89ers? Or, at best, another one of those geographic subgroups? Maybe, but not necessarily. For obvious reasons, 1989 was experienced more intensely in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe, but it still shaped a whole cohort of future leaders. The exciting forward march of freedom that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall gave them a lifelong commitment to advance the goal of a “whole and free Europe.”
Political generations are not born but made. So the question must be asked again to that Göttingen student and her classmates. Is she going to create a political class of 22ers, combining the defense of freedom and the restoration of peace in Europe with the concerns of her own generation, such as intersectional equality and the transition to green energy? The old men of ’89 and ’68 certainly hope so; but it depends on you.
https://www.ft.com/content/0fcb4c4e-9d87-4b0c-981b-8fe49d042f50
—————————————————-