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The writer is director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin.
“What was said about the desire to restore relations with Russia, to achieve an end to the Ukrainian crisis, in my opinion, this deserves at least attention,” Russian President Vladimir Putin said after Donald Trump won the elections in USA. The Kremlin hopes that Trump’s presidency will be a gift that keeps on giving, both in Ukraine and beyond.
Publicly, Russian leaders remain cautious about their expectations of the new administration. If, for example, Trump pushes to lower global oil prices to $50 a barrel, that could create long-term challenges for Putin’s system of governance. But the Kremlin can hope that the disruptions Trump will create for Washington’s European allies will outweigh any potential inconveniences.
The main fear in Western capitals is that Trump will sharply reduce support for Ukraine against Russian aggression. He has promised to end the war quickly and his closest aides have put forward proposals that would freeze fighting along current lines of contact. That would leave 20 percent of Ukrainian territory occupied, without any meaningful guarantee that Russia would not invade again later.
Of course, pushing for a ceasefire does not mean that the United States would accept Putin’s maximalist demand that Ukraine be de facto subordinated to Russia. Even with an imperfect ceasefire and beyond the elusive question of NATO member for KyivThe United States could take steps to ensure Ukraine survives as a sovereign state, including providing weapons and training, and investing in kyiv’s conventional deterrence capabilities. If implemented consistently over a long period after the fighting ends, these measures could make the cost of a new war against Ukraine prohibitive for Russia. That’s why Putin may be willing to keep fighting.
However, Putin may also have reasons to accept an imperfect deal… for now. He The Kremlin war machine He needs a timeout to rearm and rebuild his offensive capacity. The Kremlin can expect that once Trump is able to claim the role of peacemaker, his priorities will change, his administration will be pulled in different directions, Ukraine will be left in a state of gradual implosion, and the Europeans will be too divided to take the lead in providing sufficient assistance. to kyiv.
While there are too many wild cards on the table to predict the outcomes of diplomacy after Trump’s inauguration, his election removes incentives for Putin to meaningfully engage with the incumbent administration in the time he has left. Putin hopes to get a better, if not perfect, deal from Trump. The Biden administration has few, if any, with which to force him to sign a deal that is better for kyiv than a potential agreement negotiated by Trump. Furthermore, the intervening period creates many risks of its own: for example, Putin’s temptation to destroy what remains of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure this winter, thus generating more leverage for future talks. Defusing this threat requires quiet diplomacy with the Kremlin that can involve both the incoming and outgoing White House team.
Although it is desirable that the shooting in Ukraine cease, the fundamental causes of the confrontation between Moscow and the West will remain. Trump’s victory has reconfirmed Putin’s view that the West is so politically unstable that policies can change dramatically with each election cycle. Distrust of the West will therefore persist, especially as the Russian establishment becomes increasingly populated with veterans of the conflict and Putin plans to remain in power until at least 2036.
So if Trump’s team tries to offer incentives to Moscow to lure it away from Beijing’s embrace, the Kremlin will gladly pocket any carrots the United States can offer. But it will do nothing significant to shake its partnership with the neighboring giant, because China’s authoritarian communist system, and President Xi Jinping himself, will likely outlive Trump in the White House. In any case, any rapprochement by Trump could somewhat strengthen Moscow’s weakened hand in its dealings with Beijing. Finally, the fracturing effect on Europe of Trump’s return and the potential emboldening of right-wing populist forces there is a natural gift for the Kremlin. So is the increased level of internal polarization and concentration in the United States that Trump’s second term will bring.
The sad truth is that the fight against the West has become the organizing principle of the Putin regime and has created too many beneficiaries to abandon it any time soon. Trump or no Trump, Russia’s foreign policy will be guided by anti-Americanism at least as long as Putin is in the Kremlin.