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The writer is the author of ‘Black Wave’, a distinguished fellow at Columbia University’s Global Policy Institute, and a contributing editor at the Financial Times.
They have nothing in common except their hatred for each other, their skills and longevity as leaders, their unwavering battle for political survival, and now, surprising simultaneous coups.
On Monday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faced accusations of war crimes from the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. That same day, it was announced that Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 85, had lost a protégé and potential successor, a key pillar in his careful choreography to ensure a smooth transfer of power. The death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash will have repercussions in the circles of power in Iran, but also throughout the region, as the war in Gaza reaches a turning point.
Beyond the mechanisms of electing Iran’s next president and the consequences of the ICC prosecutor’s decision, this week’s events highlight how the Middle East is caught between Khamenei and Netanyahu, both clinging to power at the expense of their countries and the region.
Netanyahu has been doubling down on war and challenging US President Joe Biden to save his political career. On Sunday, US national security adviser Jake Sullivan He tried again to sell him a vision for the Middle East that would provide Israel with sustainable security and regional integration through normalization with Saudi Arabia. However, the cost to Israel – tangible steps towards a Palestinian state – remains too high for Netanyahu.
For its part, Khamenei has balanced restraint by Iran’s regional militias with shows of force since Oct. 7, while increasing repression and the power of hardliners at home. As Iran prepares for a sudden presidential election, its ability to project control will be seriously tested.
While attention should continue to focus on Israel’s destructive military campaign in Gaza and the Israeli hostages still held by Hamas, the increasingly tense regional context is equally important. The enmity between Iran and Israel, which had long been in the shadows, came to light last month with the direct exchange of missiles and drones. This was a stark reminder of how much worse tensions can get and how some of the most important dynamics at play now are driven by internal political calculations.
The shadow war between the couple continues. Last week reports emerged that Jordan had frustrated an alleged plot by Iranian-backed militias in Syria to smuggle weapons into the country, some en route to the occupied West Bank, others to carry out acts of sabotage inside Jordan.
The rapprochement that began in March last year between Saudi Arabia and Iran is also being tested. The kingdom prefers the protection of a US defense pact and normalization with Israel combined with a path to a Palestinian state, a package that would shield Riyadh from Iran’s fire and end Tehran’s claim that it alone defends the Palestinian cause. .
But after courting the Saudis for years, Netanyahu no longer seems interested. And so the House of Saud places itself between Iran’s missiles and militias and Netanyahu’s intransigence when it comes to discussing the “day after” of the war in Gaza.
The Israeli prime minister has been pushing the war to “total victory,” echoing the self-deceptive slogan chanted in revolutionary Iran during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. Ironically, both Netanyahu and Khamenei were at that time: one as Israel’s deputy ambassador in Washington and the other as president of Iran.
Netanyahu may have forgotten that Israel sold several hundred tons of weapons to Iran to help it defend against Iraqi advances, leading to a bloody stalemate. Israeli officials then hoped to engage with moderate elements in the newly created Islamic Republic. Iran and Turkey were the first two Muslim countries to recognize Israel after its founding in 1948, and Israel relied on these ties to reduce its isolation in a hostile Arab world.
Today the opposite is happening: Israel now sees ties with Arab countries as a shield against Iran. But Netanyahu does not seem to understand that his new Arab friends are not interested in a confrontation with Tehran. Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian, who also died in the crash, summarized the current relationship between the two countries in December as follows: saying “The only thing Iran and Israel have in common is that neither of them believes in a two-state solution.”
However, this is the only thing that, if Khamenei and Netanyahu accept, could bring their countries some respite of international pressure.