Seizing control of migration will inevitably bring political pain

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The writer is a director of British Future, a think tank. His new book is ‘How to be a patriot’

There is a simplistic populist narrative about high immigration: a story of betrayal. The claim is that political and economic elites ignore the persistent public demand for less immigration. But changing attitudes toward immigration make that story less and less plausible.

The net migration figures to be released next week are expected to be the highest yet, further surpassing the most recent figure of just over half a million. This creates a headache for a government that promised the overall numbers would come down. Immigration in 2022 was exceptionally high for exceptional reasons, with 200,000 Ukrainians arriving in Britain last spring. But increasing immigration is also a matter of policy choice, not just circumstance.

Brexit gave UK governments more control over immigration. One important restrictive change, the end of free movement in the EU, has been trumped by almost all other policy options that are liberalizing.

British Future has tracked public attitudes towards immigration for the last decade. Attitudes towards its economic and cultural impacts have become more positive. Historically, two-thirds of people supported lowering immigration levels, regardless of whether net migration was negative or record highs. Despite the high migration, support for lowering overall numbers has now dwindled and become more selective than ever.

Why did public attitudes change? More control has changed the debate. The question is no longer ‘open or closed’, but a number of different options: about students, NHS and care workers, bankers and seasonal fruit pickers. If there is a control dividend, it does not apply to the visible chaos on the small boats crossing the Channel, where Rishi Sunak makes promises he cannot keep.

While attitudes toward immigration have softened, they remain polarized. Almost half of the public (42 percent in 2022) would still like to see the overall numbers go down. About a quarter are sincere reducers. A fourth rival wants immigration to increase even more. Only 5 percent expressed such an opinion a decade ago. Some of those with the most liberal views—who lament the end of free movement—have the mistaken perception that immigration has declined after brexit.

But most people are more interested in control than reduction, so consider immigration on a case-by-case basis. The irony is that the government’s policy choices closely mirror public attitudes. Only one in 10 people thinks that we are bringing too many refugees from the Ukraine. The idea of ​​reducing visas for the NHS or social care is equally unpopular: only 12 per cent would restrict visas for the health service. Only 17 percent are in favor of reducing the number of fruit pickers.

There are three possible policy responses to high levels of immigration. Any credible call to reduce the numbers depends on specifying what needs to be cut. Even the most basic mathematics dictates that it will not be possible to achieve anything even close to the net figure of 100,000 without reducing the immigration that is widely popular. Any serious effort would mean reversing almost all of Boris Johnson’s typical immigration policies, saying he wants to reduce the numbers, while he pursues policies that would, in practice, maintain or increase them.

Second, the government could opt for “continuity pie” and try to weather the damage to public trust from broken promises. One mitigation is that Conservative voters are also supporters of the pie: six in 10 would reduce the overall numbers, though support for the reductions falls below a third for any specific job or study path. (By contrast, two-thirds of Labor voters don’t want to cut overall levels at all.)

A third approach would accept that immigration is high and try to manage it well. Maintaining consent for the economic gains it brings also depends on better pressure management. The impact on housing continues to be, rationally, the most widespread public concern. Business advocates need a more nuanced public voice. A response to record levels of immigration that sounds like “the only problem is that there aren’t any more” rings deaf. Employers are not paying enough attention to employment rates among the large numbers of people coming to Britain on routes outside the points-based system (Those who are entitled to work include refugees, those coming from Hong Kong and Ukraine, with family, student and dependent visas).

If the populist story on immigration were true, a government could win high praise simply by reversing all its pragmatic liberalization policy choices since 2019. But the cries of pain from the NHS, universities, farmers and the Treasury given the tax loss , would not be tolerated by the public. The overall numbers are much higher than the government anticipated. Making decisions about whether the gains from further migration outweigh the political pain is what control looks like.