Shocking! Hamas’ Daring Attack on Israel: An Eerie Throwback to the 1973 Yom Kippur War

Exactly 50 years and one day after he was completely surprised by one coordinated military attack by its neighbors – Egypt and Syria – Israel was surprised again.

Early on October 7, 2023, Hamas fighters invaded southern Israel on land, sea and air and fired thousands of rockets deep into the country. Within hours, Hundreds of Israelis were killedHostages taken and War declared. There have already been severe Israeli reprisals Cost hundreds of Palestinian lives in Gaza, and many more will surely be dead when this war is over.

Because it’s war. After the Hamas attacks began and the Israeli death toll rose, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said declared that the country was at warjust like 50 years ago.

And the parallels don’t end there.

Both wars began with surprise attacks on Jewish holidays. In 1973 it was Yom Kippur, a day of atonement for Jews. This time it was like that Simchat Torahwhen Jews celebrate the reading of the Torah.

Hamas, the Palestinian militant group under control the densely populated population Gaza Strip The country bordering Israel apparently hopes to send the same message that Egypt and Syria delivered in October 1973: they will not accept the status quo, and Israel’s military might will not ensure the security of Israelis.

The 1973 war proved it a turning point not only in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but also for Israel’s politics. Will this war be the same?

Both times I was caught off guard

Certainly, the sudden outbreak of war is over again The Israelis are deeply shocked, just like 50 years ago. This war, like the one in 1973, is already portrayed as… colossal failure of the secret services.

Although Israeli military intelligence had done so warned the government Since the enemies of the country considered Israel to be vulnerable, the secret service did not expect an attack by Hamas.

Rather, the intelligence agency’s assessment was that Hamas was primarily interested in governing the Gaza Strip and did not want to go to war with Israel, at least not for a while.

It was assumed that Hamas would be deterred from major attacks in Israel for fear of possible disproportionate retaliation from Israel, which would cause more devastation in Gaza. The enclave, home to 2 million Palestinians, many live in povertyHe still hasn’t recovered from the last big round Fight in May 2021.

Instead, intelligence and many analysts believed that Hamas preferred to export Palestinian violence to the Israeli-occupied West Bank, where it took place could help undermine the already weak and unpopular Palestinian Authorityled by Hamas’s political rival.

Their intelligence assessment has proven to be terribly wrong was before the outbreak of war in 1973. Then as now, Israel’s opponents were undeterred by its military superiority.

Israeli intelligence not only misjudged the enemy’s readiness for war, but also – both in 1973 and today – failed to recognize the enemy’s preparations.

This time, this failure is even more glaring given Israel’s extensive and sophisticated intelligence gathering capabilities. It must have been Hamas Plan this attack carefully for many months right under Israel’s nose.

This is undoubtedly Israel’s worst intelligence failure since the 1973 war.

But it’s not just an intelligence failure, it’s also a military failure. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were clearly unprepared for an attack of this magnitude – in fact Most IDF units were stationed in the West Bank.

It is true that the top brass of the IDF had done this Netanyahu warned repeatedly that his military readiness had been reduced as a result Wave of Israelis Reservists refuse to serve in protest against the government’s attempted judicial reform. Still, the IDF was confident that its defenses, especially the expensive ones, would hold up High-tech barrier built around the Gaza Strip – would prevent Hamas militants from entering Israel, as they previously did in a raid in May 2021.

But just like the so-called Bar-Lev defensive line While attacks along the Suez Canal in 1973 did not prevent Egyptian soldiers from crossing the canal, the Gaza barrier did not stop Hamas fighters from doing so. It was simply bypassed And rolled through.

The blame game begins

After this war there will certainly be the same level of blame as after the 1973 war. A commission of inquiry will probably be set up, as happened after the 1973 war – the Agranat Commission – which published a damning statement reportthereby clearly pointing the blame at the Israeli military and intelligence establishment.

But the main blame for this war does not lie with the Israeli military and secret services. It is Israel’s political establishment – above all Netanyahu, who has led the country since 2009, apart from a one-year exception between 2021 and 2022.

The 1973 war was also due to political failure, not just intelligence failure. In fact, it was Israel’s political leadership, especially Prime Minister Golda Meir and her Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, who were primarily responsible for this, because they had done it in the years before the war spurned diplomatic overtures by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. The Israeli government was determined to retain parts of the Sinai Peninsula – which Israel owned captured in the 1967 war – even at the price of peace with Egypt.

Likewise, Netanyahu has ignored recent events Egyptian efforts to negotiate a long-term ceasefire between Israel, Hamas and the other militant group Palestinian Islamic Jihad. And Israel’s electricity right-wing extremist government would rather keep the occupied West Bank than pursue the possibility of peace with the Palestinians.

Furthermore, the Netanyahu government has been preoccupied with its largely unpopular attempt limit the power and independence of Israel’s Supreme Court, a move apparently aimed at removing a potential obstacle to formal annexation of the West Bank. The domestic political turmoil and deep division that proposed judicial reform has caused in Israel is almost certainly one reason why Hamas has decided to attack now.

More broadly, the latest attack has made clear that Netanyahu’s strategy to contain and deter Hamas has failed disastrously. It was disastrous for Israelis, especially those living in the south of the country, and even more so for Palestinian civilians in Gaza.

maintaining one Blockade of the Gaza Strip for 16 yearswhich is crippling its economy and effectively imprisoning its 2 million residents, has not brought Hamas to its knees.

Rather, Hamas’s control over Gaza, maintained through repression, has only intensified. Innocent civilians on both sides of the border have paid a heavy price for this failure.

After the 1973 war Meir had to resignand a few years later, the ruling Workers’ Party – which had been in power in various guises since the country’s founding in 1948 – was defeated by Menachem Begin’s right-wing Likud Party 1977 general election. This was a turning point in Israeli domestic politics, caused in large part by the public’s loss of confidence in the then-dominant Labor Party as a result of the 1973 war.

Will history repeat itself this time? Will this war finally mark the end of Netanyahu and Likud’s long dominance of Israeli politics? Most Israelis have already done so turned against Netanyahurepelled by the mix of corruption scandals that surround him, his attempts to weaken the power of the judiciary and the rightward shift represented by his ruling coalition.

More Israelis could do the same now, as this devastating surprise attack certainly contradicts Netanyahu’s claim that he is Israel’s “soldiers.”Mr. Security“.

Whatever the outcome of this new war and its political impact in Israel, it is already clear that Israelis will long remember its outbreak with great sadness and anger, just as the 1973 war still is.

In fact, it will likely be even more traumatic for Israelis than this war, because while in 1973 military personnel bore the brunt of the surprise attack, this time it is Israeli civilians who have been captured and killed, on sovereign Israeli territory. In this crucial respect, then, this war differs from that of 1973.

Dov Waxman is Professor of Israel Studies at the Rosalinde and Arthur Gilbert Foundation, University of California, Los Angeles.

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