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The writer is a non -resident member in the Korea Economic Institute of America
It was December 2023 when Robert O’Brien, the National Security Advisor during Donald Trump’s first mandate, called on the regulation of the online platform proposed by South Korea. The proposal would designate some dominant platform operators of American technology companies, subject to ex -regulation before. Citing the consequences of national security, O’Brien argued that the regulatory movement of Seoul, which had been strongly influenced by the EU Digital Markets Law (DMA), “would be a gift for the Chinese Communist Party,” leaving Chinese companies without playing Americans. . As tensions increased, the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) left the proposed agenda.
The case of South Korea highlights the intricate challenges facing the average powers in the regulation of their national digital markets, which are largely dominated by US players, without antagonizing the new administration of the United States. The country is known for its robust technological players of their own harvest. But while there is a pressing domestic need to guarantee fair competence and address monopolistic practices in the digital sphere, regardless of the nationality of the companies, South Korea fears increase the tensions with the US. UU. On the platform regulations , even with long -standing commercial agreements such as the Korus FTA instead.
In September last year, Republican Congresswoman Carol Miller presented the Digital Trade Compliance Law of the United States.claiming that Seoul is considering regulations that “unduly loading the companies of the United States while benefiting Chinese technology companies.”
More recently, Trump’s candidate for the American commercial representative on this issue attracted significant attention in Seoul. When asked about digital trade and regulations led by South Korea aimed at American technology companies during his Senate Confirmation Hearing this month, Jamieson Greer declared: “We must not outsource our regulation to the EU or Brazil or any other person , and they can “t discriminate against us, and will not tolerate.”
In addition, Trump’s recent Announcement on reciprocal rateswhich addresses the “non -nocturnal barriers”, including “digital commercial barriers,” clearly points out that any foreign regulation with an impact on US companies and technological platforms would be subject to compensation. Beijing’s recent Tit-For-OT reaction to additional Trump’s 10 percent tariff American technology companies should be reasons for reprisals.
The fact that TLC Korus renegotiates during Trump’s first term involves little weight, since Seoul is still disagreeing with Washington, this time in digital trade. Trump pursues what is considered amorphous and arbitrary arbitrary barriers under his “Fair and reciprocal plan“. Last week, he issued Another memorandum Protecting US technology, promising necessary actions, including rates, against “regulations imposed on United States companies by foreign governments that could inhibit the expected growth or operation of the United States companies.”
Adding fuel to the fire, the continuous political agitation in Seoul after the statement of the South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol of Martial Law in December and the posterior row on his arrest has only intensified the uncertainty for the country in this already precarious period, with a ” Tariff man “back in the White House.
Although almost two dozen bills related to the regulation of the online platform have been introduced in the current National Assembly of South Korea, the “Brussels effect” without appropriate DMA in South Korea, which had won impulse Previously, it is now eclipsed by the Trump effect. As insinuated by KFTC president comment Last week, commit to avoid commercial conflicts with Washington about the regulation efforts of the Seoul platform, South Korea faces a uphill battle in its attempt to regulate its own digital markets amid broader economic and commercial considerations. There is also apprehension at home that if any other form of platform regulation passed, it would be Korean technology companies that give the worst part of the application, they leave it at a competitive disadvantage.
This changing landscape underlines the tension between the regulatory ambitions of South Korea and the external pressures that remodel its policy. This is likely to become more pronounced under Trump 2.0, as policy formulators carefully evaluate the broader implications of their decisions.