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The Internal Crisis of Vladimir Putin’s Regime
The writer is a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, Berlin and a Visiting Fellow at the European University Institute, Florence.
Vladimir Putin appears to have overcome his biggest internal crisis since the Chechen war that began his reign. But the Russian president’s allies at home and abroad are in no hurry to congratulate him. The mood among the elite and the tone of official propaganda are far from triumphant. The very possibility of a coup after 23 years of rule, and in the second year of the Ukraine war, a campaign that was supposed to cloak Putin and his regime in glory, casts doubt on his control over Russia. He also challenges the idea of unanimous support from a patriotic majority.
The seizure of Rostov-on-Don, one of Russia’s largest cities, by the leader of the Wagner military group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and his rapid advance 200 km from Moscow, painted a startling picture of the impotence of the authorities, although partly it is explained by the desire to avoid bloodshed. Some Rostov residents even delivered flowers to the mutineers from the private military company. The people of a country taught by state propaganda that there is no greater betrayal than “color revolutions” recreated the typical symbolic gesture of such uprisings.
Prigozhin’s uprising had its roots in upsetting an internal balance that Putin had maintained for years, but which began to unravel after the stuttering invasion of Ukraine. Many Russian citizens refuse to acknowledge the weakness of their country. They blame the defeats in Ukraine on indecision and betrayal at the top. Failures on the front have brought demands for further militarization of the economy and purges of the elite. Prigozhin’s vision for Russia went even further: a giant North Korea with its population and economy in full mobilization, at least until victory.
Prior to the invasion, Prigozhin’s role in the Russian system was that of a service provider. With Wagner and his troll factory, the ex-convict was doing Putin a favor by engaging in tasks the state was reluctant to undertake on his own behalf: intimidating domestic enemies, interfering in foreign elections and fighting in Africa. As a result, an increasingly ambitious non-state entity with state functions emerged.
With Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Wagner’s significant contribution to the war, Prigozhin’s role changed. He led public campaigns marked by provocative statements on domestic and foreign policy. His calls to punish the state apparatus and mobilize private companies earned him a lot of support in a short time.
Prigozhin chose to cross the line after June 10, when Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu issued an order to subordinate “volunteer” combat formations to his ministry. This threatened Prigozhin with the loss of his main power asset in the face of the official Russian armed forces. However, he did not challenge Putin directly, for good reason. During two decades in power, Putin has merged with the Russian state in the eyes of the population to such an extent that, for many, going against him would amount to an attack on Russia itself.
Prigozhin’s aim appears not to have been to overthrow the ruler but to partly replace him. Eliminating Shoigu would have allowed Prigozhin to demonstrate his importance not only as a mercenary commander but as a politically influential figure. Prigozhin’s attack on Shoigu, whose military successes in Crimea and Syria made him the regime’s second most popular figure after Putin, was an attempt to secure that position for himself.
Putin has avoided the worst-case scenario: civil war-style clashes between “patriots”, bloodshed, and army shelling of cities. The state apparatus, especially in the regions of Russia, demonstrated at least passive loyalty. But all of this came at the cost of tremendous stress to the system. Prigozhin’s actions have put the pro-war camp, which highly respected him, in a difficult position. The charges of treason so often leveled against opponents of the war can now be leveled against some of his supporters. The official dividing line between “good” and “bad” Russians, or “patriots” and “traitors,” is no longer clear.
Russia’s “patriotic majority” has long suspected that the country’s wealthy rulers and private business elites are indifferent to national interests and ordinary people. This was precisely Prigozhin’s claim, and he will continue to resonate despite his apparent marginalization.
Putin will have to continue to play the precarious role of protector of the “corrupt elite” or, under pressure from the events of the past weekend, embark on a purge of that elite. In this sense, Prigozhin’s adventure may spell the end not only of the current form of Putin’s regime but also of the entire legacy of post-Soviet Russia.
Additional Insights on the War in Ukraine
Understanding the Power Dynamics in Putin’s Regime
The recent internal crisis surrounding Vladimir Putin’s regime has shed light on the power dynamics within the Russian government. While Putin has managed to maintain control over the country for over two decades, the events of the Ukraine war and the uprising led by Yevgeny Prigozhin have raised questions about his true authority and the loyalty of his allies.
The seizure of Rostov-on-Don, a major city in Russia, by the Wagner military group led by Prigozhin highlighted the potential weaknesses in the authorities’ ability to maintain order. The fact that some residents even showed support for the mutineers indicates a lack of trust in the government and a growing disillusionment with the state propaganda that portrays any opposition as betrayal.
Prigozhin’s uprising can be seen as a result of the internal balance being upset, particularly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Many Russian citizens refuse to accept the country’s weaknesses and instead blame the failures in Ukraine on indecision and betrayal from those in power. This has fueled demands for further militarization and purges of the elite, as individuals like Prigozhin envision a Russia with full mobilization and an unwavering focus on victory.
The Evolution of Prigozhin’s Role
Yevgeny Prigozhin’s role within the Russian system was initially that of a service provider, assisting Putin and the state with tasks they were hesitant to undertake directly. Through his involvement with Wagner and the troll factory, Prigozhin gained influence and power, eventually leading to the emergence of an ambitious non-state entity with state functions.
However, with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Wagner’s significant contributions to the war effort, Prigozhin’s role evolved. He began leading public campaigns, making provocative statements on domestic and foreign policy. His calls to punish the state apparatus and mobilize private companies garnered significant support within a short span of time.
Prigozhin’s decision to challenge Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu was a calculated move to secure his own importance within the regime. By eliminating Shoigu, he aimed to establish himself as a politically influential figure, alongside his existing role as a mercenary commander. This strategic maneuver showcased Prigozhin’s ambition and desire for power, albeit without directly challenging Putin.
The State Apparatus and the Loyalty Question
Despite the potential for civil war-like clashes and bloodshed, Putin managed to avoid the worst-case scenario thanks to the passive loyalty demonstrated by the state apparatus, particularly in the regional areas of Russia. However, this passive loyalty has come at a significant cost to the system, placing tremendous stress on the regime.
The actions of Prigozhin and the subsequent charges of treason have complicated the pro-war camp’s position. Supporters of the war, who highly respected Prigozhin, now find themselves facing the same accusations of treachery that they have commonly leveled against opponents of the war. The clear dividing line between “good” and “bad” Russians, or “patriots” and “traitors,” has become blurred, further eroding the confidence of the patriotic majority in the ruling elite.
The Perception of Wealthy Rulers and Private Business Elites
The suspicion among Russia’s patriotic majority that the country’s wealthy rulers and private business elites are indifferent to national interests and the well-being of ordinary people is not a new phenomenon. Prigozhin’s uprising, with its claim of indifference from these elites, resonates strongly with this perception and continues to stay relevant despite his apparent marginalization.
The Future of Putin’s Regime and Post-Soviet Russia
The recent events surrounding Prigozhin’s adventure and the internal crisis within Putin’s regime could potentially spell the end of not only the current form of government but also the entire legacy of post-Soviet Russia. Putin now faces the delicate choice of either protecting the corrupt elite or succumbing to the pressure to purge them. This decision will have profound implications for the future direction of Russia and its governance.
As the war in Ukraine continues and internal challenges persist, the world watches closely to see how Putin and his regime navigate this critical juncture in Russian history.
Summary
Vladimir Putin’s regime faces its biggest internal crisis since the Chechen war, with the uprising led by Yevgeny Prigozhin in Rostov-on-Don shedding light on the president’s control over Russia and the loyalty of his allies. The campaign in Ukraine, intended to enhance Putin’s image, has instead raised doubts about his authority and the unity of the patriotic majority. Prigozhin’s challenge to the internal balance and his vision of a fully mobilized Russia have further exposed the weaknesses within the system.
Prigozhin’s role in the Russian system evolved from a service provider to a politically influential figure, with his involvement in Wagner and provocative public campaigns. His attempt to challenge Defense Minister Shoigu aimed to secure his own significance within the regime. Putin managed to avoid civil war-like clashes, but the loyalty of the state apparatus has come at a cost
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The writer is a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, Berlin and a Visiting Fellow at the European University Institute, Florence.
Vladimir Putin appears to have overcome his biggest internal crisis since the Chechen war that began his reign. But the Russian president’s allies at home and abroad are in no hurry to congratulate him. The mood among the elite and the tone of official propaganda are far from triumphant. The very possibility of a coup after 23 years of rule, and in the second year of the Ukraine war, a campaign that was supposed to cloak Putin and his regime in glory, casts doubt on his control over Russia. . He also challenges the idea of unanimous support from a patriotic majority.
The seizure of Rostov-on-Don, one of Russia’s largest cities, by the leader of the Wagner military group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and his rapid advance 200 km from Moscow, painted a startling picture of the impotence of the authorities. , although partly it is explained by the desire to avoid bloodshed. . Some Rostov residents even delivered flowers to the mutineers from the private military company. The people of a country taught by state propaganda that there is no greater betrayal than “color revolutions” recreated the typical symbolic gesture of such uprisings.
Prigozhin’s uprising had its roots in upsetting an internal balance that Putin had maintained for years, but which began to unravel after the stuttering invasion of Ukraine. Many Russian citizens refuse to acknowledge the weakness of their country. They blame the defeats in Ukraine on indecision and betrayal at the top. Failures on the front have brought demands for further militarization of the economy and purges of the elite. Prigozhin’s vision for Russia went even further: a giant North Korea with its population and economy in full mobilization, at least until victory.
Prior to the invasion, Prigozhin’s role in the Russian system was that of a service provider. With Wagner and his troll factory, the ex-convict was doing Putin a favor by engaging in tasks the state was reluctant to undertake on his own behalf: intimidating domestic enemies, interfering in foreign elections and fight in Africa. As a result, an increasingly ambitious non-state entity with state functions emerged.
With Russia’s full-scale invasion of the Ukraine and Wagner’s significant contribution to the war, Prigozhin’s role changed. He led public campaigns marked by provocative statements on domestic and foreign policy. His calls to punish the state apparatus and mobilize private companies earned him a lot of support in a short time.
Prigozhin chose to cross the line after June 10, when Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu issued an order to subordinate “volunteer” combat formations to his ministry. This threatened Prigozhin with the loss of his main power asset in the face of the official Russian armed forces. However, he did not challenge Putin directly, for good reason. During two decades in power, Putin has merged with the Russian state in the eyes of the population to such an extent that, for many, going against him would amount to an attack on Russia itself.
Prigozhin’s aim appears not to have been to overthrow the ruler but to partly replace him. Eliminating Shoigu would have allowed Prigozhin to demonstrate his importance not only as a mercenary commander but as a politically influential figure. Prigozhin’s attack on Shoigu, whose military successes in Crimea and Syria made him the regime’s second most popular figure after Putin, was an attempt to secure that position for himself.
Putin has avoided the worst-case scenario: civil war-style clashes between “patriots”, bloodshed and army shelling of cities. The state apparatus, especially in the regions of Russia, demonstrated at least passive loyalty. But all of this came at the cost of tremendous stress to the system. Prigozhin’s actions have put the pro-war camp, which highly respected him, in a difficult position. The charges of treason so often leveled against opponents of the war can now be leveled against some of his supporters. The official dividing line between “good” and “bad” Russians, or “patriots” and “traitors,” is no longer clear.
Russia’s “patriotic majority” has long suspected that the country’s wealthy rulers and private business elites are indifferent to national interests and ordinary people. This was precisely Prigozhin’s claim, and he will continue to resonate despite his apparent marginalization.
Putin will have to continue to play the precarious role of protector of the “corrupt elite” or, under pressure from the events of the past weekend, embark on a purge of that elite. In this sense, Prigozhin’s adventure may spell the end not only of the current form of Putin’s regime, but also of the entire legacy of post-Soviet Russia.
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